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I. Introduction to Wage Theft 
Today in the District of Columbia (“the District” or “DC”), low wage workers are being 
shortchanged. Policies currently in place make it very difficult, to nearly impossible, for victims of 
wage theft to hold employers accountable for failing to pay wages owed. The Wage Theft 
Prevention Act of 2014, co-introduced on February 4, 2014 by Councilmembers Vincent Orange, 
Jim Graham, and Mary Cheh, would provide needed accountability and stronger protections to 
ensure that those working an honest day receive honest pay for their labor.  
This document provides an introduction to the current barriers affecting workers in the District, and 
presents an overview of the ways in which the Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014 would ameliorate 
these problems; thereby making the District a better place for workers and responsible businesses.  
What is wage theft? 
Wage theft occurs when an employer refuses to pay part, or all, of a worker’s regular wages or 
overtime. The authors have found that wage theft occurs in all industries, but is especially prevalent 
in construction, restaurants, security, and domestic work. Victims may be U.S. citizens and 
immigrants; men and women of every race and ethnicity; and both full-time and part-time workers. 
How much does wage theft affect workers and the District as a whole? 
For workers who are often living paycheck to paycheck, wage theft can result in incredibly severe 
consequences, like large fees for missed payments, high-interest loans, and even foreclosures, 
evictions, and repossessions. A 2008-2009 survey of more than four thousand low-wage workers in 
American cities found that 68% experienced wage theft in the prior week. Twenty-six percent of 
those were paid under the legal minimum wage and 76% were denied overtime. On average, each 
low-wage worker lost $51 per week to wage theft, or $2,634 per year. That amounts to 15% of their 
annual income.1  
Wage theft not only harms underpaid individual workers, it also reduces District and federal 
revenues by millions of dollars per year due to tax and payroll fraud, places law-abiding 
employers at a competitive disadvantage, and depresses the consumer spending needed to 
fuel economic growth. 
How is the District doing at combating wage theft? 
Last year, a national report titled “Where Wage Theft is Legal” compared states’ wage laws and the 
District was awarded a grade of F due to the inadequate safeguards we provide for workers.2 
While stealing from your own employees isn’t technically legal in the District, the report’s title is 
essentially correct. Lack of effective deterrents, as well as woefully inadequate enforcement of DC’s 
wage and hour laws, make it painfully easy for an employer to commit wage theft and face no 
repercussions. In order to make sure that workers get paid what they’re owed, wage theft must be 
addressed on a structural level. 
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What can we do? 
If we want to stop wage theft in the District we need stronger worker protection laws, a better 
administrative process that allows workers to recover their wages, and greater penalties for 
individual employers who commit these violations. 
II. Worker Stories 
The District’s current administrative process for wage theft claims is insufficient to protect 
vulnerable workers and their families.  As the stories below illustrate, some workers’ claims linger 
indefinitely without resolution or are dismissed without notification to the worker or an explanation 
of the reasoning behind the decision.  The Office of Wage-Hour’s failure to subpoena evidence 
from uncooperative employers or to move forward with the resolution of a case when the employer 
refuses to appear at the fact-finding conference creates incentives for bad behavior and leaves 
workers without meaningful administrative recourse.  The Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014 will 
ensure that stories like those that follow cease to take place by creating a transparent and efficient 
administrative process that protects workers and holds unscrupulous employers accountable for 
stealing wages. 
A. Gregorio Hernandez 
Gregorio Hernandez has been a resident of Ward 1 for the past 
eight years. His experience demonstrates the DC Office of Wage-
Hour’s (“OWH”) minimal enforcement power and limited ability 
to protect workers. Gregorio’s fact-finding conference was 
postponed at his former employer’s request and was never 
rescheduled. His case remains unresolved. 
In August, 2012, Gregorio was hired by DA Contractors to do 
demolition and construction at the Shaw Hospital. Over a period 
of four months, he worked in several construction projects 
throughout DC and Virginia. Although he worked more than 40 
hours every week, his paycheck failed to reflect all the hours 
worked and he was never paid overtime. Gregorio began recording his hours worked to document 
his unpaid wages, and by the time he visited the Employment Justice Center’s (“EJC”) Workers’ 
Rights Clinic, he had been terminated and was owed over $8,000. The EJC helped Gregorio file a 
claim with OWH.  
Gregorio had to return to OWH multiple times to amend his claim. Although the EJC had advised 
Gregorio to file his claim against DA Contractors, OWH instructed Gregorio to file against Kosmos 
LLC, a company that Gregorio describes as an “associate” of DA Contractors. However, a few days 
later, the OWH investigator called Gregorio to inform him that he would have to return to OWH 
and file his claim against DA Contractors. Although Gregorio and his employer made an oral 
contract that he would be paid $15 per hour, DA Contractor paid him only $11 per hour and OWH 
refused to consider enforcing payment of the $4 per hour difference between the amount Gregorio 
was promised and the amount he was actually paid.  
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Since Gregorio was forced to amend his claim multiple times, his initial fact-finding conference, set 
for June 27, 2013, was first delayed to July 15, 2013, then postponed again, and ultimately canceled. 
Gregorio’s former employer requested additional time to review his records before scheduling a 
fact-finding conference; however, the conference was never rescheduled. Ultimately, Gregorio 
learned that the OWH investigator closed his case with no resolution and no contemporaneous 
notice to Gregorio simply because Gregorio mentioned that he was considering filing in small claims 
court because of the delay in the resolution of his claim through the administrative process.  
To this day, Gregorio still continues in the struggle to recover his wages. 
If the Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014 had been in effect, Gregorio would have had the 
right to a prompt hearing with an Administrative Law Judge, rather than an informal 
conference that was indefinitely postponed and surreptitiously canceled. Gregorio could 
also have established the actual rate of pay he was promised through credible testimony.  
B. Yvonne Johnson: “It’s really frustrating for me and 
my family.”  
Yvonne Johnson’s experience with the DC Office of 
Wage-Hour highlights the lack of transparency and due 
process surrounding administrative decisions.  
 
On February 8, 2013, Yvonne Johnson, a long term 
resident of Ward 8, was not paid for her work as a special 
police officer for Code 3 Protective Services on her 
regularly scheduled payday. Though she was paid her 
wages three days later, not being paid on time meant that 
Yvonne did not have bus fare to get to work for the next 
three days. When she did not go to work, she was fired. 
In addition, although Yvonne worked 8 hour shifts without a lunch break for six years, her employer 
nonetheless deducted half an hour from her pay for a lunch break that she was never allowed to 
take.  
 
Yvonne visited EJC’s Workers’ Rights Clinic and was referred to the OWH. Code 3 sent a human 
resources representative to a fact-finding conference with OWH Director Pam Banks. The 
company’s representative denied that they owed Yvonne any additional wages, and that all late wages 
had already been paid. Director Pam Banks requested that the company provide additional pay stubs 
and time sheets to verify their claims.  
 
When Yvonne called Director Banks to check on her case, Director Banks told her that the 
company had sent over the information she had requested, and that OWH’s determination was that 
Code 3 no longer owed Yvonne any wages. Yvonne asked to see the information that Code 3 had 
submitted, but Pam Banks refused to give her access.  
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Yvonne’s case was simply closed. She was never provided with the evidence used to justify the 
adverse decision nor was she provided with the opportunity to rebut that evidence or informed of 
any possibility for an appeal. She was never able to recover the wages she alleges she was owed. 
 
Yvonne would have greatly benefited from the Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014. She 
would have had the right to request a formal administrative hearing before an 
Administrative Law Judge, she would have had the opportunity to examine and respond to 
all evidence considered, and she would have had the opportunity to appeal an adverse 
decision. She may also have succeeded in recovering the liquidated damages she was owed 
due to late payment. 
C. Viviane Leungue: “I can smile now.”  
When Viviane Leungue’s employer refused to pay her $4,200 of her wages, 
Viviane chose to defend her rights by filing a claim with OWH. Fifteen 
months later, with no help from OWH, Viviane recovered her wages thanks 
only to her own willingness to publicize her case to the media. 
In January 2010, Viviane began to work as a home health aide for Ultra 
Home Health Agency, earning $10.50 per hour. Over the next two years, 
Viviane received her paychecks only sporadically, initially six weeks to two 
months apart and longer over time. This was less frequent than required 
under the District’s Wage Payment and Collections law. The late payments 
continued until Viviane became fed up and quit her job in January, 2012. 
She had not received five of her last seven paychecks. Viviane called her 
former supervisor every week, but the supervisor only made excuses about not having the money to 
pay Viviane’s wages. 
Frustrated, Viviane went to EJC’s Workers’ Rights Clinic for advice and then filed a claim with 
OWH. Viviane met with an OWH investigator in April, 2012 and showed the investigator her 
timesheets and bank statements to show how much the company owed. The investigator told 
Viviane that she would be in touch soon. Viviane called the investigator every two weeks for an 
entire year. Each time, the investigator told Viviane that she had sent a letter to Ultra Home Health 
Agency, but had been unable to get in touch with them. For over a year, the investigator never 
informed Viviane of changes in the status of her case, and never contacted her to provide any 
updates.  
In June, 2013—more than a year after the filing of her claim with OWH—Viviane  decided she had 
waited long enough. She contacted her former supervisor and asked when she would be paid. The 
supervisor claimed to not even know who Viviane was. However, Viviane told her that she would 
call the media to tell them about the wage theft. The strategy worked and after twenty-one months, 
Viviane was handed a check for the full amount of her unpaid wages.  
Viviane’s story demonstrates that employers are able to get away with wage theft with remarkable 
impunity. “I am very disappointed in the Office of Wage-Hour, because when someone goes to that 
office to get help with their problems, the office needs to do more to stand up and defend the 
workers,” says Viviane. “They need to stand up and help those who need it the most. They need to 
stand up and investigate what is going on at companies like mine, and all the other employers who 
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are doing the same thing.” In addition, Viviane’s experience of wage theft plagued her for over a 
year, as she was consumed with thoughts of the disrespect from her employer and OWH. “This 
situation has been very stressful for me, to work and not get my pay,” she says. “I thought about it 
all the time because I know it is so much money that I was owed.” Now that the case is closed, 
Viviane feels relieved. “I can smile now,” she explains.  
With the Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014, an Administrative Law Judge would have had 
the power to issue an enforceable default judgment against subpoena Vivian’s employer 
when it failed to appear. Her employer would have faced real penalties beyond the wages 
owed, which would serve as a larger deterrent from committing wage theft in the future than 
merely having to pay the wages owed back without interest after years of delay. 
D. Eliseo Hernandez: “What was done to me is theft.” 
Eliseo Hernandez’ story shows that the Office of Wage and Hour is not 
effective in protecting workers from wage theft due to its lack of 
enforcement power.  “What was done to me is theft,” says Eliseo, who is 
a resident of Ward 1. “The Office of Wage-Hour needs to take the 
responsibility for making employers of the city follow the law like they 
should. The office needs stronger laws to accomplish their mission.” 
In February 2011, Eliseo began working with Gryphon Tile installing 
tiles on the walls of Wilson High School. They did not pay him anything 
until three weeks after he started working, and even then, they only paid 
him for one week. As a result, he stopped working six weeks after he 
started. By then, he was owed more than $2,500. 
Eliseo tried to settle with the owner of the company. The owner only answered one of Eliseo’s 
many calls, and claimed he did not owe Eliseo anything. Eliseo went to EJC for advice and was 
referred to the OWH. After filing a claim with OWH, Eliseo attended a fact-finding conference with 
the owner of the company and OWH Director Pam Banks. In the conference, the owner agreed to 
pay Eliseo what he was owed. When Eliseo did not hear back for three weeks, he went back to 
OWH and an investigator explained that the owner had said he sent another check for Eliseo, which 
had already been cashed. But Eliseo had never received a check.  
From there, the OWH told Eliseo that he would himself have to investigate to find out who cashed 
the check. He went to two different banks before he found out that the owner of the company had 
cashed the check himself in Middletown, Virginia. Eliseo went to Middletown to investigate, seeking 
police assistance. A Middletown detective called the owner, who told the detective that he had 
cashed the checks in order to pay Eliseo in cash. The detective agreed to get a video from the bank 
to verify who had cashed the check and send it to OWH. He never did. 
In September, 2011, the OWH investigator explained that they had passed Eliseo’s case to the 
Office of the Attorney General, and that it could take a very long time to resolve. Two years later, 
Eliseo’s case still had no resolution because the Attorney General has not yet begun to prosecute. 
Eliseo was able to find a group of law students who helped him file in small claims court, and he 
was able to eventually recover $1,300 of the wages he was owed. He never recovered the rest of his 
wages, and received no compensation for the two year delay in obtaining his wages.   
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With the Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014, Eliseo’s employer would have been unable to 
ignore the adverse decision rendered by the Office of Wage-Hour. Eliseo would have been 
able to promptly seek a formal hearing with an Administrative Law Judge, which could have 
issued an enforceable decision and subpoenaed the employer to compel them to appear. 
Eliseo would have saved a great deal of time, effort, and money spent investigating his case 
on his own. He would have been able to recover the full amount of wages he was owed with 
liquidated damages and his employer would have owed penalties to the District.  
E. José Ramirez and Yohan Perez 
 
José Ramirez, a resident of Ward 2, and Yohan Perez, a resident of Ward 1, both worked for a 
popular restaurant until mid-2011 when they experienced wage theft. Yohan was fired in May, 2011, 
and was still owed four weeks’ wages. José Ramirez lost his job when the restaurant suffered a fire, 
and was still owed three weeks’ wages. Both of them made repeated attempts to contact the 
restaurant owner to ask for their wages. The restaurant owner ignored their phone calls, pretended 
he wasn’t in the restaurant when they showed up, and insisted that he would pay them, but never 
did.  
 
 
 
Both José and Yohan filed separate wage claims with the DC Office of Wage-Hour. Yohan, who 
filed his claim in July, 2011, went to OWH for a scheduled fact-finding conference, but the 
restaurant owner did not show up. The OWH investigator first rescheduled the conference and then 
ultimately told Yohan not to bother coming in to the rescheduled conference either because the 
employer wasn’t going to show.  
José’s fact-finding conference was never scheduled. The investigator instructed José to call OWH in 
a month to ask if there was news on his case. José called many times over the next several months, 
but the investigator always said that there was no news on the case because the restaurant owner 
would not take his calls.  
Eventually, all cases against the restaurant owner were referred to the Office of the Attorney 
General. However, the Attorney General never litigated the case. Ultimately, José and Yohan united 
with other workers who were owed wages by the same restaurant owner. Through a combination of 
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public demonstrations and media pressure, they arrived at a settlement agreement with the owner. 
Two years later, they recovered some of the wages they were owed. 
“I had no result and decided not to bother the investigator again,” said José, reflecting on his 
experience with OWH. “I feel that with their inability to find a solution to my case, the DC Office 
of Wage-Hour demonstrated their inability to enforce the laws of Washington, DC.”  
 
José and Yohan’s case demonstrates that without the power to issue enforceable judgments, 
the DC Office of Wage-Hour is unable to resolve cases where the employer refuses to even 
appear and participate in the process. The Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014 would have 
allowed the workers to win a default judgment if their employer refused to participate and to 
enforce that judgment, leading to a much quicker resolution of their cases. José and Yohan 
might not have felt the need to turn to public protest in order to recover their wages. 
III. Summary of the Wage Theft Prevention Act 
of 2014 
The Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014 (“The Act”), co-introduced on February 4, 2014 by 
Councilmembers Vincent Orange, Jim Graham, and Mary Cheh, is designed to strengthen and 
expand safeguards against wage theft in the District. The Act would combat wage theft by 
establishing formal procedures to enable victims of wage theft to recover unpaid wages and 
damages; increasing the penalties for those responsible for committing wage theft; providing greater 
protection for workers who stand up for their rights; making it easier for wage theft victims to get 
legal representation; and making it easier for workers to collect awards from businesses that steal 
their wages. Ultimately, the Act would not only benefit workers, but also responsible employers who 
now have to compete with businesses that profit by engaging in unlawful business practices such as 
wage theft. 
Formal Hearings and Enforceable Judgments 
The current administrative process for challenging wage theft only allows workers to pursue stolen 
wages through informal meetings mediated by an investigator. These meetings are not held on the 
record, do not result in a formal judgment for or against the employer, do not involve sworn witness 
testimony, can take months to schedule and often do not reach a resolution at all. Under the Wage 
Theft Prevention Act of 2014:   
● Claimants would be able to choose between formal hearings held by Administrative Law 
Judges where wage claims would be fully adjudicated and informal mediation by the Office 
of Wage-Hour. 
 
● Formal hearings would be held within 45 days of a request and default judgments would be 
issued against businesses that fail to appear. 
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● Administrative judges would have the authority to issue subpoenas, weigh the veracity of 
witness testimony and other evidence, and issue formal appealable and enforceable 
judgments. 
 
Increased Penalties 
Under the existing law, penalties for wage theft are so low that the costs the OWH would incur in 
holding hearings to determine penalties would be higher than the penalty that might ultimately be 
collected. Because penalties are small and rarely if ever assessed, there is little to deter unscrupulous 
employers from breaking the law. Under the Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014:   
● Maximum administrative penalties for non-payment of wages would be increased to $50 per 
day for the first violation and $100 per day for subsequent violations and between $100 and 
$500 for failing to provide workers with notice of their rights or similar violations. 
 
● Minimum and maximum criminal fines would be set to reflect the amount of wages stolen as 
well as a business’s level of culpability and history of misconduct. 
  
● OWH and the Office of Attorney General, like private attorneys, would be entitled to 
recoup enforcement costs from defendants found liable for wage theft.  
 
● When business owners are delinquent in complying with administrative or judicial orders in 
wage theft cases, the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs would suspend their 
businesses licenses. The businesses would also be required to post public notices of their 
non-compliance. 
 
Greater Rights for Workers 
Under the current law, employers do not have to inform workers in writing of how much or when 
they will be paid. The lack of a written record makes it difficult to adjudicate any subsequent wage 
dispute. Workers are also inadequately protected from retaliation, especially when they demand their 
unpaid wages without filing a formal complaint with the District. Under the Wage Theft Prevention 
Act of 2014:     
● Employers would be required to provide a simple form to workers that would include the 
employer’s business name and contact information and the rate and method for calculating 
the worker’s pay. When employers fail to keep required records, the worker’s testimony 
about an agreement would be presumed true. 
 
● Workers would be better protected from retaliation for exercising their rights. 
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● The Statute of Limitations would be tolled when employers fail to post notices of worker 
rights. 
 
● Workers would be able to bring class actions or have their rights supported in court by labor 
or community organizations. 
 
● Workers’ consent would be required before their complaints could be settled by the District 
or a third party. 
 
● General contractors would be jointly responsible when their subcontractors commit wage 
theft. 
 
Better Access to Representation for Victims  
Currently, finding representation in actions to recover unpaid wages is difficult, because individual 
claims are often small and judges sometimes award less than an attorney’s usual hourly fee even, 
when claims are found meritorious. Under the Act: 
● Workers with similar claims against the same employer would be allowed to choose whether 
to bring a class action or a collective action, making representation of multiple workers 
easier. 
 
● Judges would be given clearer instructions on how to calculate and award attorneys’ fees, 
lowering the risk that successful attorneys would lose money even when they successfully 
prosecute meritorious claims. 
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IV. A Closer Look at the Wage Theft Prevention 
Act of 2014 
The Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014 seeks to reduce the incidence of wage theft in the District 
by creating a process that will be fair, transparent, and reliable.  The Act would establish formal 
procedures to enable victims of wage theft to recover unpaid wages and damages; increase the 
penalties for unscrupulous employers engaged in wage theft; provide greater protection for workers 
who stand up for their rights; make it easier for wage theft victims to get legal representation; and 
make it easier for workers to collect awards from businesses that steal their wages.   
A. Formal Hearings and Enforceable Judgments  
Workers and employers need a process for resolving claims for unpaid wages that is fair, efficient, 
and transparent. As it now stands, the District’s process is informal, unpredictable, and subject to 
delays that often leave many workers’ claims in limbo. To strengthen the District’s current program, 
the Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014 will create a formal hearing process, which will be used 
when a party believes that informal meetings are insufficient to resolve a complaint. Administrative 
Law Judges will preside over formal hearings, which unlike the fact-finding conferences held in the 
current system, will take place on the record and result in formal orders with findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. This streamlined process will facilitate the enforcement of orders and permit 
both employers and workers the opportunity to appeal findings. Although the Wage Theft 
Prevention Act of 2014 will leave in place a process that encourages parties to informally resolve 
wage disputes without requiring them to immediately commence formal proceedings, this 
conciliation process will be optional.     
1. Right to Prompt, Formal Hearing 
Under the current administrative process, workers are denied the opportunity to present their claims 
at a formal administrative hearing.3 The denial of this opportunity creates tremendous uncertainties 
for all parties. As the process currently stands, workers file wage complaints with the Office of 
Wage-Hour (“OWH”), which is part of the District’s Department of Employment Services 
(“DOES”). An OWH investigator then informs the employer about the complaint and schedules an 
informal meeting between the parties in the hopes of resolving the wage dispute. This informal 
meeting is referred to as the “fact-finding conference.”   
Current law mandates no specific time frame for the scheduling of this conference and there are no 
regulations governing how the OWH investigators develop and preserve a complete record or base 
their decisions on that record. In fact, because there is no requirement for written determinations 
with factual findings and conclusions of law, there is no way to be certain what evidence was 
considered and found to be credible or what the basis for a legal decision is. Rather, after an 
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informal discussion with the parties, the investigator simply tells both parties what the investigator 
thinks should happen, with no written record of the decision or clear enforcement mechanism.  
The uncertain and informal nature of these proceedings makes it difficult, if not impossible, for 
parties to challenge the legal or factual basis on which these decisions are reached. Without a public 
and written factual record and final order, proceedings cannot be reviewed for accuracy and 
completeness or for soundness of legal reasoning and basis in fact. Additionally, because fact-finding 
conferences are informal, even the procedure for challenging their outcome—such as the requisite 
legal standard of review, or what court to seek review in—is unclear. This is particularly a problem 
for workers who cannot obtain private representation and have few alternatives to the administrative 
process, but often cannot even find out the status of their case, let alone how to resolve it. 
Employers, on the other hand, often simply ignore adverse decisions unless and until the case is 
referred to the Office of Attorney General and a claim is filed in court, at which point they can 
usually raise new legal defenses or settle the case with little if any cost beyond what they owed 
initially. 
The Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014 will dramatically improve this process by creating greater 
transparency and safeguards for all parties. When parties cannot resolve their differences through 
the fact-finding conference overseen by an OWH investigator, either party will be able to obtain a 
formal administrative hearing.4 The formal hearings will be presided over by an Administrative Law 
Judge who will hear testimony presented under oath, receive and examine evidence, and ensure the 
creation of a complete and public record.5  Hearings must take place promptly within 45 days of a 
request for the hearing, and upon conclusion of the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge must 
issue a written final order that will include the findings of fact and conclusions of law that form the 
basis of the final order.6  The order will be enforceable in court and can also be challenged in court 
by either party under the substantial evidence standard set out in the D.C. Administrative Procedure 
Act.7 
This policy is similar to the administrative process in California, which provides for wage theft cases 
to be adjudicated through an evidentiary hearing when the claim cannot be resolved through an 
informal conference.8  As proposed in the Wage Theft Protection Act, California’s hearings are held 
on the record, parties and witnesses testify under oath, and orders can be appealed.9  Similarly, 
DOES unemployment and workers’ compensation hearings, as well as the Department of 
Consumer and Regulatory Affairs hearings on unfair business practice complaints, follow similar 
formal procedures.   
Such procedures foster trust in the administrative process by ensuring that both employers and 
workers are given the opportunity to fully and accurately present their case; are provided with 
written findings supported by the facts and law; and receive clear instructions as to how such 
findings may be contested. 
2. Prompt and Reliable Resolution of Claims 
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Under the current law, there is no definite time frame within which an informal fact-finding 
conference must be held. Moreover, once a conference is scheduled, the employer can proactively 
pay the alleged wages owed, present oral or written counter claims, or appear at the informal 
conference to dispute the claims. Unfortunately, the current system makes it very easy for employers 
to do none of the above. This is because the Office of Wage-Hour does not exercise authority to 
require the employer to appear at fact-finding conferences and there are no clear consequences or 
penalties for employers who ignore OWH investigators or fail to appear at the fact-finding 
conference. Even in cases where employers decide to dispute alleged claims, they are often able to 
postpone the fact-finding conference indefinitely by using various delay tactics.10  D.C.’s current 
system only emboldens unscrupulous actors. For workers who live paycheck to paycheck, the delay 
in obtaining a resolution unnecessarily worsens an already unjust situation.   
Another problem with D.C.’s current wage dispute system is that employers face no consequences if 
they fail to respond to a complaint or fail to attend a scheduled informal conference. There are no 
clear statutory fines, no use of subpoena power on the part of the Office of Wage-Hour, and no 
mechanism for administratively adjudicating wage claims unless the employer voluntarily 
participates. While a default judgment would be issued against an employer that failed to participate 
in an unemployment or workers’ compensation hearing, no similar consequences attach in the 
OWH’s process. The Office of Wage-Hour’s inability to keep employers accountable results in a 
great imbalance of power and nullifies the effectiveness of the administrative process for many 
workers. Under this system, employers have an incentive to ignore complaints and notices from the 
Office of Wage-Hour with little risk of adverse consequences.   
The Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014 remedies this in three ways. First, under the Act, formal 
hearings will be held within 45 days of a request by either party.11  This policy will ensure that 
workers have a reliable time frame for resolution of their claims and payment of earned wages and, 
where applicable, liquidated damages.  
Second, employers will be discouraged from simply ignoring rightful claims for unpaid wages filed 
against them.12  Once employers receive notice of a complaint as well as their rights and obligations, 
they will have 15 days to respond by admitting the allegations or denying them and requesting a 
hearing or conciliation. If the employer does neither, the allegations in the complaint will be 
regarded as admitted, and a default judgment enforceable in court will be issued in favor of the 
worker.  
These changes will close a loophole that allowed employers to avoid a determination that they owed 
wages by simply failing to respond or appear. Just as traffic citations require drivers either to pay or 
contest their tickets, but cannot simply be ignored with impunity, defendants will have the choice of 
whether to respond to a wage theft complaint or have their failure to respond construed as an 
admission of liability. This policy is also similar to the citation procedures used in Washington 
State,13 where departments tasked with enforcing wage and hour laws can issue citations for non-
compliance. In both jurisdictions, if not appealed, such citations become final and binding. Similarly, 
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the New Mexico Day Labor Act provides that if the defendant fails to respond to the complainant’s 
claim within 10 days, a finding will be made in favor of the complainant.14 
Third, employers will not be able to stall the process by failing to appear at the administrative 
hearings. If the employer denies the allegations in the complaint, but fails to appear at the scheduled 
hearing, the worker will nonetheless be allowed to present evidence. The Administrative Law Judge 
will then issue a judgment based on the evidence presented.15  This policy will ensure that claims are 
resolved even where there is a deliberate lack of cooperation by employers. California employs a 
similar policy: if the employer fails to appear, “the Labor Commissioner must nonetheless hear the 
evidence offered and issue an order, decision, or award in accordance with the evidence.”16  
In short, the Act will close loopholes that are allowing employers to derail the process and avoid 
liability by simply failing to participate in the administrative process. Moreover, both parties will 
have access to a fair process that gives meaning to the substantive protections of the law.      
  
3. Administrative Law Judges with Authority to Issue Subpoenas 
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Granting adjudicators clear authority to obtain evidence and weigh its veracity is important for the 
transparency and efficacy of the wage claims process. Under the current legal framework, the OWH 
investigators have failed to issue subpoenas to compel employers and witnesses to appear at 
hearings. This is a problem because, by its own admission, “[c]laims requiring the most processing 
time are cases where the employer simply refuses to fully cooperate [with OWH].”17  Some 
employers fail to cooperate by ignoring all of the notices sent by OWH to attend conferences and by 
failing to open their payroll records for investigation.18 As a result, workers’ claims can linger 
without resolution both before and after they are referred to the Office of the Attorney General 
(“OAG”). The OAG then determines which cases to litigate, but due to limited resources, the OAG 
does not assume representation in most referred cases. As a result, most claims for unpaid wages 
that are referred are simply left unresolved, effectively shielding some unscrupulous employers from 
liability and denying some workers their rightfully earned pay.  
The Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014 will grant definite subpoena authority to the Administrative 
Law Judges that will be conducting formal hearings, allowing them to compel the cooperation of 
parties whose participation is essential to resolve claims.19  If a person subject to the subpoena 
refuses to obey it, the Administrative Law Judge, or one of the parties, will be able to seek 
enforcement in court. Importantly, if a person willfully ignores the subpoena, he or she will face 
consequences, including a fine of up to $500 or 60 days in prison, or both. Other jurisdictions like 
California, Kansas, New Mexico, and Miami-Dade County also allow hearing officers to issue 
subpoenas to compel attendance and the production of evidence to resolve wage claims.20   
This policy will ensure that both employers and workers have access to relevant evidence and are 
given a fair chance to present or defend their case. This will allow Administrative Law Judges to 
make determinations based on a complete record. Additionally, issuing enforceable subpoenas will 
provide a strong disincentive to employers who, under the current policy, could simply ignore 
requests for information without facing clear consequences.  
4. Administrative Orders Enforceable by Worker or Attorney 
General 
The success of the administrative process is largely dependent on the ability of workers to enforce 
final orders and ultimately obtain payment for wrongfully withheld wages. Unfortunately, even 
where the OWH investigator finds that wages are owed, the informal nature of the current system 
leaves workers without a clear process to enforce the informal finding. Under current law, the OWH 
investigator is not required to issue formal findings or determinations, or provide any findings in 
writing at the conclusion of the fact-finding conferences. Consequently, the success of the current 
process hinges on the employers’ willingness to comply with the informal resolution agreed upon at 
the fact-finding conference. If an employer fails to comply, OWH refers the case to the Office of 
the Attorney General, where, after substantial delay, a decision is made on whether to litigate or 
drop the case. Some cases remain without resolution for months, or even years, with little 
communication with claimants whose statutes of limitations are continuing to run. Even where the 
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OAG does decide to litigate, there is no administrative record or factual findings to review, and no 
final written order to enforce. Each case must begin from scratch in Superior Court.  
The Act will remedy this by requiring that final, written orders be issued at the conclusion of the 
formal administrative hearings.21  The orders must contain findings of fact, conclusions of law, the 
remedy ordered, and the reasoning upon which the decision is based. This will make the process 
more fair and transparent for all the parties involved. The order will be enforceable in court and can 
also be appealed in court by either party.22  Similarly, other jurisdictions, including California, Kansas 
and Miami-Dade County also require the issuance of enforceable final orders, as well as findings of 
fact and conclusions of law.23 In California for example, the order—including a summary of the 
hearing and the reasoning that forms the basis of the order—must be filed within 15 days of the 
hearing date. If the parties do not file a timely appeal, the order becomes final and enforceable as a 
judgment by the Superior Court.24   
These policies will ensure that the wage claims process works as intended by increasing the 
likelihood of workers obtaining payment for their wages and providing a clear process for both 
workers and employers to protect their interests. 
5. Informal Mediation Option with Both Parties’ Consent  
The preservation of an informal process to resolve wage claims will ensure the efficient use of 
resources. Under the current system, workers’ claims for unpaid wages are evaluated during an 
informal fact-finding conference, run by an OWH investigator. However, as described above, the 
current process is so informal that it fails to safeguard the rights of the very workers it is meant to 
protect. The Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014 will strengthen the current process by (1) 
providing for a conciliation process upon the written consent of both parties, (2) allowing both 
parties to withdraw from conciliation at any point and proceed to the formal hearing before an 
Administrative Law Judge, and (3) giving weight to any settlement agreement by reducing it to an 
administrative order that can be enforced in court.25  In order to encourage settlement, no 
statements made during the conciliation process would be allowed as evidence in a subsequent 
proceeding (except to interpret a settlement agreement) without the written consent of the parties.  
Other jurisdictions with a comparable process are California and Miami-Dade County. In California, 
the wage claims process similarly provides for informal conferences. If a matter cannot be resolved 
informally, an administrative hearing is held and a final determination is made.26  In Miami-Dade, 
where a conciliation conference is available, if parties cannot arrive at a resolution through informal 
means, the claim is referred for a formal hearing. Like in the Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014, 
nothing said in the informal conference can be used in a formal hearing without the parties’ 
agreement.27 
Allowing parties to pursue informal conciliation will avoid the overburdening of the formal hearing 
process with claims that could have been resolved outside of the formal setting. Additionally, 
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reducing settlement agreements to enforceable orders will ensure the effectiveness and enforceability 
of these agreements. 
B. Increased Penalties 
Under current law, businesses that withhold workers’ wages face minimal penalties and risk of 
prosecution. Without any threat of facing substantial penalties for noncompliance, businesses have 
little incentive to comply with wage and hour laws in the first instance. Instead, it is actually 
profitable to engage in wage theft. Even if a business is found liable and eventually forced to pay 
some or all of the wages owed, it has in effect received what amounts to an interest-free loan.  
The Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014 addresses this by (1) increasing both administrative and 
criminal penalties to levels commensurate with the severity of an employers’ violation, (2) allowing 
OWH and the Attorney General to recover the cost of enforcing wage claims, including attorneys’ 
fees, (3) dedicating awards for costs and penalties to fund future enforcement, (4) requiring 
additional payments when employers fail to comply with final orders or agreements, and (5) 
requiring that the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs suspend the business license of 
business owners who are delinquent in complying with orders to pay wages or other damages.  
1. Administrative Penalties 
The administrative penalties that in theory may be assessed against businesses that violate wage and 
hour laws are paltry. Maximum penalties for failure to pay wages owed to workers are $300 for initial 
violations and $500 for subsequent violations or $1,000 for paying less than the minimum wage. 
Moreover, because these penalties are discretionary and involve substantial additional administrative 
processes (including a hearing), the Office of Wage-Hour has never imposed administrative penalties 
in recent years. Indeed, according to testimony by Department of Employment Services Director 
Lisa Mallory, DOES has not yet even enacted hearing procedures that would enable penalties to be 
assessed.28 
While this deprioritization of administrative penalties may appear logical from a purely budgetary 
perspective because the cost of holding a hearing is greater than the penalties that might be 
collected, the net result is a strong economic incentive for businesses to commit wage theft. 
Businesses also have little incentive to respect legal requirements to post notices, provide 
information to their workers, maintain records, or allow inspection of their records because, in those 
cases, there would be no direct monetary damages and the fine is the only money the employer 
might be required to pay. 
Under the Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014, administrative penalties would be calculated based 
on the type of violation, the history of violations by the business, and the amount of time the 
violation has gone un-remedied.29  Where the violation involves the nonpayment of wages, first-time 
violators would be fined $50 for every day that wages go unpaid, while subsequent violators would 
be fined $100 per day. Businesses would face separate fines for failing to post required notices of 
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Wage-Hour investigations or non-compliance ($500); failure to maintain payroll records, failure to 
allow inspection of payroll records by the Office of Wage-Hour ($500); failure to inform workers of 
their wages and pay rates ($500); and failure to post notice of minimum wage laws ($100 per day). 
These penalties resemble similar daily30 and offense-specific31 administrative penalties in San 
Francisco.   
While these penalties begin small, they increase with time. This makes collecting penalties more 
financially feasible for the Office of Wage-Hour because employers would have an incentive to pay 
what they owe promptly and to participate fully in the adjudicatory process to avoid further fines. 
Additionally, offense-specific penalties not only make enforcing notice and record-keeping 
requirements more viable for OWH, they encourage businesses to comply with wage and hour laws 
in their entirety. 
2. Criminal Penalties 
Current law also provides for criminal penalties for violations of wage and hour laws. The penalties 
are only occasionally relevant, however, because the Office of Attorney General does not appear to 
prioritize criminal enforcement of wage and hour laws and because, in cases where the employer 
does not maintain adequate records, it is difficult to prove violations beyond a reasonable doubt, as 
would be required for criminal convictions. Nevertheless, adequate criminal penalties are important 
to express the public’s strong condemnation of businesses stealing from their workers and to 
contribute to public awareness of the seriousness of the crime when particularly serious cases are 
prosecuted. 
Under the current law, if the employer is convicted of willfully failing to pay wages owed for the first 
time, the maximum criminal fine is only $300 in fines and up to 30 days in jail. Even repeat willful 
offenders face a maximum criminal fine for withholding wages of only $1,000 and, in theory, up to 
90 days in jail. If an employer violates the Minimum Wage Revision Act, potentially larger fines of 
up to $10,000 or, for subsequent offenders, imprisonment of up to 6 months is possible, but few if 
any employers have actually been fined or imprisoned for anywhere near the maximum amount. 
Furthermore, fines are only available if a worker can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the wage 
theft was willful, which is extremely difficult. Finally, while these amounts represent maximum 
penalties, there are no minimums. The Office of Wage-Hour and the Office of Attorney General 
have broad discretion to reduce fines or to impose no fines at all, which they typically do in order to 
settle cases.  
Current law allows businesses to withhold wages from their workers with little risk of serious 
consequences. Employers get significant savings when their violations go unreported by workers 
who fear retaliation, get a free loan during the enforcement process when violations are reported, 
and face minimal, if any, additional costs even when they are found guilty of violating the law. The 
Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014 encourages compliance with wage and hour laws by calibrating 
minimum and maximum penalties to be proportionate to the amount of wages stolen, whether the 
business was a repeat violator, and whether the violation was willful. 
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Criminal penalties are commonly imposed for non-willful wage theft in many jurisdictions, including 
Connecticut,32 New York33 and Massachusetts.34  This ensures that employers cannot escape liability 
by pleading ignorance where willfulness is likely, but difficult to prove. It also encourages self-
policing by employers, allowing employers who commit good faith errors to promptly correct them 
and avoid substantial penalties.  
Under the proposed law, criminal fines for non-willful first-time violators would be set to be no less 
than the amount of wages owed, but no greater than $10,000.35  For violators who are repeat 
offenders or engaged in willful violations, the criminal fine would be at least double the amount of 
wages owed, but no greater than $25,000. Finally, for violators who both acted willfully and 
repeatedly violated the law, the fine would be at least triple the wages owed, but no greater than 
$50,000.  
These maximum fines are similar to those already employed in Massachusetts,36 which received one 
of the highest ranks for wage theft prevention laws by the Progressive States Network,37 and the 
tiered system of fines that are proportionate to wages owed is already employed in New York State 
with significant success.38  By allowing for judicial discretion within the range set out in the statute, 
the Act would ensure those who commit wage theft face real consequences for their attempts to 
exploit vulnerable workers and that those consequences are proportionate to the severity of their 
crime. Under this system, the risk of unlawfully withholding wages would be commensurate with 
any potential gains, short-circuiting the incentive to commit wage theft.  
The Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014 creates serious consequences for wage theft in order to 
encourage better compliance with District workplace protection laws. It does so by imposing 
minimum penalties in proportion to the amount of wages stolen, setting maximum penalties 
comparable to those in other states, and making it harder for employers to escape punishment by 
claiming ignorance. 
3. Litigation Costs Recoverable and Dedicated to Future Wage 
and Hour Law Enforcement 
Under the current law, judges are required to determine and award “reasonable” attorneys’ fees and 
costs when the Office of the Attorney General sues to enforce wage and hour laws. Judges are often 
reluctant to award the actual full costs of litigation, however, especially when they are much greater 
than the amount of unpaid wages recovered. Thus, even if the number of hours spent enforcing the 
District’s wage and hour laws are reasonable and no more than necessary to successfully prosecute a 
claim, the attorneys’ fees actually awarded may not always reflect a typical hourly rate for that 
number of hours. In addition, there is no method for the District to recoup any of its costs for 
investigating or adjudicating administrative claims that do not lead to litigation in court. With the 
limited availability of funding for OWH, this creates an incentive to reduce enforcement in response 
to budgetary pressure and may explain why no penalty hearings have been held to date.  
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The Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014 ensures that the Office of Wage-Hour and the Office of 
Attorney General can afford to enforce wage and hour laws by allowing both to recoup the costs of 
enforcement and dedicating any attorney fees, penalties, fines, or costs recovered to the future 
enforcement of wage and hour laws.39  It also clarifies that judges are required to base attorneys’ fees 
on the actual costs of litigation, even though they may often be larger than the amount of wages 
recovered. This would allow the Attorney General or private attorneys to recoup the costs of 
enforcing violations of the minimum wage and wage payment laws, whether the amount of wages is 
large or small. Second, under the new administrative claims procedure, Administrative Law Judges 
could award the costs of enforcement to the Office of Wage-Hour. Such fee-shifting structures are 
important tools for enforcement of strong wage and hour laws and can be found in many 
jurisdictions, including New York,40 Connecticut,41 and San Francisco.42   
Finally, all criminal fines and administrative penalties would be dedicated to the Office of Wage-
Hour to use for enforcing wage and hour laws. This provides the Office of Wage-Hour with an 
important financial incentive to aggressively enforce wage and hour laws, as well as the guaranteed 
means to do so. Connecticut dedicates administrative penalties to an enforcement fund and is 
recognized as a national model for its enforcement efforts.43 The National Employment Law Project 
noted that dedicating penalties to future enforcement is a best practice in the field.44  By 
guaranteeing funding for enforcement, the Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014 ensures resources 
are consistently available to protect workers and their wages. 
4. Additional Award for Failure to Comply with Final Judgment 
or Executed Settlement Agreement 
Under the current law, businesses face no additional consequences for failing to pay wages, damages, 
or penalties ordered by the Office of Wage-Hour. This means that even when the Office of Wage-
Hour believes a worker is owed wages, the employer can avoid paying unless and until the Office of 
Attorney General separately sues them in Superior Court. This makes compliance more costly for 
the Office of Wage-Hour and lengthens the amount of time workers must go without the wages 
they have earned.  
Under the Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014, businesses that refuse to comply with orders to pay 
wages, damages or penalties will see their total liability increase by 10% for each month they fail to 
comply.45  Such increases will continue until all liabilities, including the 10% additional payments, are 
paid. This incentive structure already exists in San Francisco46 and serves to encourage quick 
compliance with administrative orders, saving the enforcing agency the costs of protracted 
enforcement, while making workers whole as soon as possible.  
5. Suspended Business Licenses for Non-compliance  
Businesses that fail to comply with administrative or judicial orders issued in response to wage theft 
violations are currently allowed to continue operating their business, competing unfairly with 
responsible and fair employers who comply with the law. Under the Wage Theft Prevention Act of 
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2014, the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs would suspend businesses licenses of 
business owners who are delinquent in complying with administrative or judicial orders.47 The 
businesses would also be required to post public notices of their non-compliance. As noted above, 
under the current law, there are limited incentives for businesses to comply with administrative 
orders to pay wages. To further encourage prompt compliance, if businesses fail to comply with 
final orders to pay wages, they would be given 30 days to come into compliance before the 
Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs would suspend their business license. This policy, 
modeled on a similar policy from San Francisco,48 would give businesses a strong incentive to 
comply with orders to pay wages.  
C. Greater Rights for Workers 
Although federal law forbids employers from underpaying their workers, it does not provide enough 
systematic enforcement of workplace rights. States such as California and New York have already 
taken steps to close the gaps by increasing workers’ rights and legal protections. These states’ laws 
require greater clarity in wage agreements and wage calculations and expand the means by which 
workers can obtain justice for unpaid wages.49 
In order to adequately enforce wage and hour laws, the District must enact similar laws to help 
create avenues for workers to engage in wage theft prevention themselves. Increasing workers’ 
awareness of and participation in wage recovery measures gives them greater leverage to defend 
their rights in the workplace. By encouraging employer-worker dialogue about agreed upon wages 
and increasing workers’ ability to seek administrative remedies, the Act would help the most 
vulnerable workers become their own advocates in the fight for fair employment.  
Specifically, the Act would (1) require employers to give written notices to workers indicating their 
expected pay, overtime rate, pay dates and the business’s contact information; (2) create greater 
protections for workers from retaliation; (3) extend the time period in which wage theft victims may 
make a claim where the employer has failed to provide required notices; (4) grant complainants 
greater agency in settling their wage disputes in the administrative process; and (5) broaden 
accountability for wage theft to include general contractors as well as subcontractors.  
1. Written Notices 
Under the current law, employers do not have to inform workers how much or when they will be 
paid, creating a disparity in power in what should be a mutually beneficial transaction – the exchange 
of pay for services. Without a written record confirming the rate and date of payment, workers have 
difficulty resolving disputes and holding employers accountable for unpaid wages.  
Immigrant workers, who are overrepresented in the District’s low-income job market, are especially 
vulnerable to this type of exploitation. They are often disconnected from broader community 
networks that educate workers about their rights. Because of this marginalization, immigrant 
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populations often suffer wage theft silently, without the hope of seeking administrative remedies or 
confronting their employers about receiving correct payment.  
On behalf of all marginalized workers, D.C. lawmakers must ensure that there is both adequate 
understanding as well as enforcement of wage agreements. Following the example of other states 
with high immigrant populations – such as New York and California - D.C. should require 
employers to provide written notice of expected payment upon hiring workers, thereby ensuring that 
all workers in the District have the leverage necessary to settle subsequent wage disputes.50  
Notices would indicate the rate of a worker’s pay, the basis of that pay (if it is determined by the 
hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, etc.), any allowances to the minimum wage (such as 
meals, tips, or lodging), the exact overtime rate of pay, and the expected date of payment.51  
Furnished with this calculation of the expected pay and overtime rates upon accepting employment, 
workers can compare this primary agreement of expected pay with the paystubs they later receive, 
and, when necessary, self-advocate when incorrect payment occurs. 
Also, because many employers do not give their office address, name or telephone number upon 
hiring, some workers, especially day laborers, have difficulty contacting their employers in order to 
receive timely and correct payment for their work. To prevent fly-by-night businesses from cheating 
workers out of their wages, this law would require all employers to provide up-to-date contact 
information to their workers upon hiring them.52 The written notice of expected wages would 
include the employer’s business name, aliases, physical and mailing address and telephone number. 
For employers’ convenience, DOES would make a template form available that could be used to 
share the wage agreement and contact information with their workers.  
2. Retaliation and Oral Testimony 
In addition to providing greater support for internal advocacy and resolution of wage theft disputes, 
the Act also provides several new protections to workers who seek legal remedies regarding wage 
theft claims: it clarifies that workers can give oral accounts as testimony of wage theft, and it further 
protects them from retaliation when they engage in protected activity covered in the proposed law. 
The Act would protect wage theft victims who file internal complaints regarding underpayment of 
wages and also encourage them to seek administrative or legal remedies if their employer is unwilling 
to reconcile the wage dispute internally, thereby granting them greater agency in the complaint 
process. 
Under the current enforcement process, workers who are victims of wage theft have difficulty 
proving that they were denied proper wages. Even though it is employers who often fail to comply 
with record-keeping laws, it is usually workers who suffer the consequences by facing difficulties in 
proving their claims. To better enforce wage and hour standards, the proposed provisions would 
create greater incentives for compliance with record-keeping regulations by crediting workers’ oral 
testimony in wage disputes where employers have not provided the notice of terms and maintained 
records of wages paid or time worked. This will force wage theft violators to bear the consequences 
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of their bad payment practices and failure to maintain records of hours worked and wages paid, 
rather than shifting the burden to the workers. New York recently passed a comparable law that 
exposes employers to penalties for failure to keep records and shifts the burden of proof to the 
employer. 53 Workers who are victims of wage theft will also be protected from losing their ability to 
file complaints due to the statute of limitations because the faulty practices of their employers 
prevented them from filing timely claims. 
Fear of retaliation also deters victims of wage theft from complaining about payment violations. 
Many workers do not even report wage theft because doing so might put them at risk of losing their 
job, suffering discriminatory treatment at work, or—in the case of immigrants—even being 
deported.54  Workers should be able to request written notices of payment and the employer’s 
contact information without any subsequent penalization or discriminatory treatment. The proposed 
law would increase penalties against employers who threaten, intimidate or take any other adverse 
action against wage theft complainants, 55 thereby encouraging wage theft victims to come forward 
to report violations, and rebalancing the disparity of power between employers and workers with 
regard to correct wage payment. The anti-retaliation provisions would encourage workers to 
advocate for their rights within the workplace and to resolve wage disputes internally, before turning 
to external legal measures.  
3. Tolling 
Aside from the fear of retaliation or the lack of adequate proof, another deterrent to stopping wage 
theft is the time limitation during which victims of wage theft may make claims. Currently, D.C. 
Wage-Hour law provides that the time period of three years for filing a complaint begins when the 
illegal action occurs. However, because employers currently are not required to provide written 
notice of the rate of an worker’s pay, the basis of that pay (if it is determined by the hour, shift, day, 
week, salary, piece, commission, etc.), the exact overtime rate of pay, and the expected date of 
payment, many victims of wage theft are unaware of the scope of their employer’s wrongdoing.  
Acknowledging that many wage theft victims are unaware of these fundamental details concerning 
their wages, this bill would toll the period to file claims if an employer fails to adhere to the current 
requirement to provide notice explaining workers’ rights under District employment laws or the 
proposed requirement to give written notice of the details of a worker’s wages.56  Without such 
written notice, the statute of limitations would not begin to run until the worker becomes aware or 
should reasonably have become aware of their rights under the law. This provision strikes a balance 
between merely extending the statute of limitations (as New York has recently done) and 
encouraging employers to be diligent and transparent with their wage practices.  
4. Consent of the Complainant in Settlements 
The Act not only aims to give workers greater ability to resolve wage disputes with their employers, 
but it also enhances their agency and participation in the legal process, even when enforcement 
actions are initiated by the Office of Wage-Hour rather than the complainant. By requiring the 
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consent of wage theft complainants in the settlement of claims brought by the Office of Wage-
Hour,57 the new law would grant these marginalized members of the workforce greater authority in 
the decision-making process of administrative offices. Complainants would also be allowed to 
inquire and receive status updates of the enforcement of the decisions. Allowing for this 
participation in the justice system would empower those who had previously suffered exploitation 
and disenfranchisement.   
5. Subcontractors / Contractors 
In many cases, culpability for wage theft extends beyond one bad actor—a general contractor can 
often be just as responsible for the failure to pay workers the wages due as those workers’ direct 
employer. For day laborers especially, wage theft can usually be linked to a chain of poor practices 
that begins with the general contractors. Many times, when subcontractors withhold wages from 
their workers it is because they in turn did not receive payment from their contractors for 
commissioned work. If the subcontractors lack the financial resources to pay workers, holding them 
exclusively accountable for wage theft will not fully compensate victims of wage theft or adequately 
deter future wrongdoing.  
Under the Act, contractors would be jointly responsible when their subcontractors fail to pay their 
workers.58 This would encourage general contractors to pay their subcontractors in a timely manner, 
and to only work with subcontractors who follow the District’s laws. By broadening accountability, 
the most vulnerable workers in the industry—day laborers and other low-income workers—would 
have greater protection from bad practices. 
D. Better Access to Representation for Victims  
1. Class Actions and Interested Parties  
While the proposed law certainly tries to encourage all victims of wage theft to file complaints for 
bad payment practices, it anticipates that there will continue to be victims who will not seek 
administrative or legal remedy because they lack the resources, knowledge or security to execute 
such procedures.59  To better incorporate disenfranchised workers into the justice-seeking process, 
the proposed law would allow class action groups, community or labor organizations, and other 
interested parties to advocate on behalf of individuals who may not always do so themselves.60  Such 
a legal measure would broaden the impact of litigation and administrative decisions to support those 
who had previously found justice inaccessible; it will generate community support against wage theft 
by supporting smaller, more localized networks that might advocate on behalf of the most 
vulnerable workers.  
2. Attorneys’ Fees 
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Requiring an employer found liable for wage theft to also pay a worker’s legal fees and costs is the 
only way to ensure adequate representation and full compensation of victims. The victims of wage 
theft are often low-income wage earners without the financial means or incentives to make payment 
of the fees and costs associated with vindication of their rights worthwhile (or even possible). The 
fact that quality legal counsel carries a significant expense should not bar victims from enforcing 
their rights. 
Under current law, a worker’s costs and fees associated with successful litigation of a violation of 
District wage theft laws are potentially borne by the defendant employer. However, the law only 
provides that a court may “allow” such costs and fees to be borne by the Defendant and offers very 
little guidance as to the proper measure of fees or appropriate costs to be awarded.61  In contrast, the 
Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014 would require that such fees and costs be borne by the 
defendant employer and provides needed guidance on how such fees are to be calculated and what 
costs are appropriately paid by the defendant. 
The Act provides that the presiding judge “shall award” fees and costs to the attorneys of workers 
where there has been an order in favor of the worker.62  Specifically, such fees are to be computed 
pursuant to the matrix approved in Salazar v. District of Columbia, 123 F.Supp.2d 8 (D.D.C. 2000) and 
updated to account for the current market hourly rates for attorney’s services. Such matrices are 
regularly used in cases involving fee-shifting statutes, and provide a reasonable basis upon which to 
calculate an appropriate fee by taking into account an attorney’s years of practice, the market rate in 
the affected area and adjusting yearly for inflation.63 
Additionally, recoverable costs in the proposed bill are specifically defined to include expert witness 
fees, depositions fees, witness fees, juror fees, filing fees, certification fees, the costs of collecting 
and presenting evidence, and any other costs incurred in connection with obtaining, preserving or 
enforcing the judgment or administrative order. The clarifications and examples concerning fees and 
costs provided in the Act will help courts accurately and adequately compensate victims of wage 
theft and ensure that victims have better access to representation. 
V. Conclusion 
The Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014 provides an opportunity to fix DC’s broken wage theft 
claims process.  Currently, workers in the District who experience wage theft must go through an 
uncertain, inefficient and unreliable process to claim stolen wages.  Some claims linger unresolved 
indefinitely, and the resolution of claims is often up to the mercy of unscrupulous employers who 
refuse to cooperate with the process while facing no real consequences.  For workers whose wages 
are stolen and their families, each day without proper pay can mean a day without money for bus 
fare, food, rent or other basic needs.  At the same time, responsible employers have to compete with 
unscrupulous ones who cut costs by refusing to pay rightfully earned wages.  The District of 
Columbia can do better.  The Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2014 would provide a transparent, 
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efficient, and reliable process to file and resolve wage claims and it would keep unscrupulous 
employers accountable, therefore making DC a better place for workers and responsible employers. 
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